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CHAPTER SIX 
LIMITS ON THE DURATION OF COPYRIGHT: 
THEORIES AND PRACTICE 
TYLER T. OCHOA 
SUMMARY 
1he question of how long a copyright should last has troubled scholars and policymakers 
ever since the first copyright statute was enacted. 1he controversy continues because 
there are two divergent views concerning the basic rationale underlying copyright law. 
Under the natural rights view, the author of a literary or artistic work has a natural 
right to profit from the fruits of his or her artistic labor. TIle logical extreme of the 
natural rights view is that copyright should be perpetual and is limited in duration 
only because of certain practical considerations. Under the utilitarian view, however, 
copyright exists primarily to encourage the creation and distribution of new literary 
and artistic works. With a n  exclusive right, a publisher can charge a higher-lhan­
eflicient price, earning excess profits that are used to compensate the author. Because 
the higher price is ineflicient and contrary to the public interest in the long run, 
copyrights should last o nly as long as is necessary to accomplish their incentive function.  
Historically, copyright terms have consistently increased over time, as common­
law countries that initially adopted the utilitarian view have moved closer to t�e 
natural rights view in the interests of international harmonization. 1his increase IS 
consistent with public choice theory, which posits that when the benefits of a law are 
concentrated but the costs of that law are diffuse, a small well-focused interest group 
will usually succeed in obtaining passage of the law, even if it does not benefit society 
as a whole. 
How long should a copyright last? This question has troubled scholars 
and policymakers ever since the first copyright statute was enacted in  
England in 1710 and continues to  do so today. The controversy con­
tinues because of fundamental differences of opinion concerning the 
basic philosophy and purposes of copyright law. As explained below, 
there are two principal schools of thought concerning the rationale for 
and purposes underlying copyright law: the utilitarian view and the 
natural rights view. While these alternative justifications for copyright 
often work in harmony and lead to similar public policy prescriptions, 
in the area of copyright duration they are in conflict and lead to dia­
metrically opposed policy recommendations. 
10 Alysoll Pllrker, 1'11111 A. Illlms IIlId Olnsfiml Sfcil/cck (l�L'), Time: limits and Constraints, pp. 149-178 
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1. THEORIES OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION 
Copyright as a Natural Right 
Under the natural rights view, the author or creator of a new literary 
or artistic work has a natural right to profit from the fruits of his or her 
artistic labor. The natural rights view finds support in the writings of 
John Locke, who famously posited that property results from the mix­
ture of a person's labor with anything appropriated from the general 
state of nature (Locke 1988, 287-89). The application of Locke's theory 
to l iterary property was stated eloquently by William W. Ellsworth, 
speaking for the House Judiciary Committee in 1830: 
Upon the first principles of proprietorship in property, an author has 
an exclusive and perpetual right, in preference to any other, to the fruits 
of his labor .... If labor and effort in producing what before was not 
possessed or known, will give title, then the literary man has title, per­
fect and absolute, and should have his reward: he writes and he labors 
as assiduously as docs the mechanic or husbandman. The scholar, who 
.secludes himself, and wastes his life, and often his property, to enlighten 
the world, has the best right to the profits of those labors. (Gales and 
Seton 1831,7: cxx). 
This view also finds support in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, which states that "Everyone has the right to the protections of 
the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, l iterary 
or artistic production of which he [or she] is the author" (Art. 27(2)). 
The logical extreme of the natural rights view is that the duration of 
copyright should be perpetual. Only a handful of countries, however, 
have ever enacted a perpetual copyright law, and most of those eventu­
ally thought better of it and restricted the term of copyright.l There are 
a number of reasons why copyright is limited in time, even in coun­
tries that generally accept the natural rights view. First, legal recogni­
tion of property rights is based in part on the economic efficiency of 
exclusive ownership: common ownership of tangible property leads to 
the so-called "tragedy of the commons" in  which the asset is depleted 
by overuse. Unlike tangible property, however, intangible works of 
authorship are "nonrivalrous" in nature and can be possessed by many 
individuals Simultaneously without restricting the possession of oth-
1 Sec, c.g., Law of May 27, 1 927, Arts. 1 5( I) & 36 (Portugal). 'Ihis law was repealed 
and replaced with a life-plus-50-years term in 1 985. Law No. 45/85 of Sept. 1 7, 1 985, 
Art. 31 (Portugal) .  
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ers and without diminishing the value of the asset (Yen 1999, 550-53; 
Lemley 2005, 1050-52). As a result, for intangible property, greater 
net  economic efficiency may be achieved by moderating the natural 
rights view.2 Second, after a period of time, it often becomes difficult 
to identify, locate, and negotiate with all of the heirs and assignees who 
have a share of the copyright, meaning that many otherwise produc­
tive uses of the work will not be realized because of transactions costs 
(Ricketson 1992, 766; Dietz 1978, 161).3 'nlird, there is the possibility 
that an author's heirs will try to suppress works of which they do not 
approve or will license the works only with unreasonably restrictive 
conditions that will harm the public's use and enjoyment of the work 
(Ricketson 1992, 767-68). For all of these reasons, there is a public 
interest in allowing unrestricted public access to and use of an intan­
gible work of authorship after a limited period. 
TIle Utilitarian View of Copyright 
Under the utilitarian view, copyright is an exception to freedom of 
expression that exists primarily for the benefit of the public, in order 
to encourage the creation and distribution of new literary and artistic 
works. Without copyright, copiers would always be able to undercut 
the initial publisher's price because they have not had to bear the fixed 
cost of  producing the work. Publishers would therefore be unwilling to 
pay authors for the creation of new works, and only authors who had 
other sources of income could afford to write. By eliminating competi­
tion from free-riding copiers, copyright enables publishers to charge 
m ore than the efficient marginal price, giving them profits from which 
to compensate the author (Lemley 2005, 1054-55; Landes and Posner 
1989). In the words of Thomas Babington Macaulay, speaking in the 
House of Commons in 1841: 
The principle of copyright is this. It is a tax on readers for the purpose 
of giving a bounty to writers. The tax is an exceedingly bad one; it is a 
tax on one of the most innocent and salutary of human pleasures .... 
I admit, however, the necessity of giving a bounty to genius and learning. 
2 Other scholars reach the same conclusion using natural rights philosophy, criticiz­
ing the view that natural rights inevitably lead to perpetual copyright as "superficial" 
(Yen 1990, 554-557) .  
3 Empirical support for this concern can be found in  studies concerning so-called 
"orphan works," that is, those works for which a copyright owner cannot be located 
despite a diligent search. (Register of Copyrights 2006, 26-34; Vetulani 2008, 7-8). 
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In order to give such a bounty, I willingly submit even to this severe and 
burdensome tax. (Macaulay 1853, 394) 
But because this higher price is by definition inefilcient, exclusivity 
should be granted only to the extent necessary to encourage the initial 
creation and distribution of the work, and the work should enter the 
public domain as soon as possible. llms, in Macaulay's words: 
The advantages arising from a system of copyright are obvious. It is 
desirable that we should have a supply of good books; we cannot have 
such a supply unless men of letters are liberally remunerated: and the 
least objectionable way of remunerating them is by means of copy­
right. . .. [But] Copyright is monopoly, and produces all the effects which 
the general voice of mankind attributes to monopoly . . . .  [T]he effect of 
monopoly generally is to make articles scarce, to make them dear, and 
to make them bad .... Thus, then, stands the case. It is good, that authors 
should be remunerated; and the least objectionable way of remunerating 
them is by a monopoly. Yet monopoly is an evil. for the sake of the good 
we must submit to this evil; but the evil ought not to last one day longer 
than is necessary for the purpose of securing the good. (Id., 390-92). 
Of course, determining exactly what period of copyright is necessary 
to encourage the creation and distribution of the desired number of 
new works of authorship is a daunting task. At one extreme, Stephen 
Breyer (now an Associate Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court) once 
argued that the lead time necessary for a free-rider to duplicate a 
published book was sufficiently long that copyright might not even 
be necessary to encourage publishers to make an initial investment 
in producing the work (Breyer 1970, 299-302, 309-13; see also Tyer­
man 1971; Breyer 1972). Although this argument breaks down for 
works initially distributed in  digital form (which are easily copied), the 
fact that publishers make investment decisions using very short time 
horizons nonetheless suggests that relatively short terms of copyright 
would be sufficient to encourage publishers to invest in distributing a 
copyrighted work (Breyer 1970, 325). 
At the other extreme, William Landes and Richard Posner have 
questioned the basic assumption that works of authorship in  the pub­
lic domain can be freely copied without losing their value. 'TI1ey posit 
that "congestion externalities" exist, such that overexposure to a work 
will cause consumers to value it less, whereas wise management of a 
work over time will help it retain its value (Landes and Posner 2003, 
484-88). Accordingly, while they agree that a relatively short fixed 
term (about 20 years) is a sufilcient incentive for most works, they 
I 
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would allow copyrights to be renewed indefinitely for successive peri­
ods (Id., 5 17-18). Other scholars, however, dispute both the existence 
of congestion externalities and the belief that continued private man­
agement of a work benefits the public (Karjala 2006; Lemley 2004). 
But even if short terms of copyright are sufficient to encourage pub­
lishers to distribute new works, they may not be sufficient to encour­
age enough authors to create new works. While it is undoubtedly 
true that some authors would create new works even if no copyright 
protection were provided, few would dispute that copyright encour­
ages more people to become authors than would otherwise be the 
case. Ideally, we would like a term of copyright that is sufficient to 
enable an author to devote himself or herself to writing (or painting 
or composing) as a full-time profession (Guinan 1957, 74). This may 
include some provision for copyright to endure after the death of the 
author, as there is anecdotal evidence that authors are motivated by 
the need to provide for their heirs (See e.g. Brylawski and Goldman 
1976, J 1l6-17, J201). On the other hand, long terms of copyright may 
encourage a successful author to retire, instead of devoting himself or 
herself to further creative activity. In addition, economists agree that 
future benefits must be significantly discounted to take account of the 
time value of money, so that the prospect of earning additional royal­
ties in the distant future may proVide little motivation for the creation 
of new works in the present (Akerloff et al. 2002, 5-7, 23). 
In the face of such disagreements in economic theory and lacking 
sufficient empirical data concerning the behavior of authors and pub­
lishers, we may be left with little more than gut feelings in deciding 
what the appropriate term of copyright should be. Accordingly, the 
behavior of legislators and interest groups takes on added importance 
in explaining how copyright terms are established in practice. 
Public Choice 711eory 
Public choice theory is a branch of economics that applies game theory 
and decision theory to government action. One of the tenets of pub­
lic choice theory is that because individuals tend to act rationally in  
their own self- interest, they will act to  try to  influence the legislature 
only if the perceived benefit to be gained is greater than the cost to 
the individual. 111e result is that a small interest group that has a lot 
of money at stake in a particular bill will expend more resources and 
will generally be more effective in lobbying the legislature than will 
"\ 
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the general public, for whom the cost of the bill on an individual basis 
may be very small (Olson 1965; Bard and Kurlantzick 1999, 2 16-28; 
Lessig 2004, 2 16-18). 
Public choice theory works very well in explaining how decisions 
concerning the duration of copyright are made. Consider, for exam­
ple, the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 (CTEA), 
which added 20 years to the terms of all existing and future copyrights 
in the United States.4 It was estimated that the aggregate amount of 
royalties that would flow to copyright owners from extending copy­
right terms by 20 years was approximately $317 million (Rappaport 
1998, 16). This works out to about $2.58 per individual voter.s But the 
benefits of that extension would accrue largely to a handful of power­
ful media corporations and a small number of heirs of very famous 
authors. TI1US, it is rational for a large media company to spend mil­
lions of dollars lobbying for copyright term extension (because the 
benefit it would receive is several t imes greater), but it is  also rational 
for the individual voter to remain ignorant of the issue. As a result, 
Congress disproportionately heard about the costs and benefits of the 
law from copyright owners, and the CTEA passed by a substantial 
margin, notwithstanding the fact that most academic commentators 
believed that i t  represented bad public policy (See e.g., Bard and Kur­
lantzick 1999; Karjala 1998; Lessig 2004, 2 18, 292-93). 
Public choice theory helps explain why the scope of copyright pro­
tection and the duration of copyright terms have steadily increased 
during the past three centuries and are rarely, if ever, dimin ished. In 
the rest of this chapter, we will examine how the duration of copyright 
terms has increased over time and summarize the current state of the 
law regarding duration. Before doing so, however, i t  may be helpful to 
discuss some international differences in the general attitude toward 
the foregoing theories of copyright protection. 
An International Perspective 
As a general matter, common-law countries have proceeded from the 
view that copyright exists primarily to serve the public benefit, while 
civil law countries have historically placed a greater emphasis on the 
1 P.L. No. 105-298, Title I, 1 1 2 Stal. 2827. 
5 According to the U.S. Census Bureau, there were about 1 23 million registered 
voters in 1 998 (the year the CTEA was enacted) .  ( Bureau of the Census 2000, 3). I f  
calculated on  the basis of the estimated 1 98 million people of  vot ing age, the amount 
per person works out to ahout $J.(iO per person. 
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natural rights of the author. This is apparent in the very language used 
to describe the law: while in common-law countries the preferred term 
is "copyright," in most civil law countries the more accurate transla­
tion in English is "authors' rights."6 It is also apparent in the greater 
emphasis that civil law countries place on the "moral rights" of the 
author. In most countries, in addition to the economic rights enjoyed 
by the author, which can be assigned in exchange for monetary reward, 
the author also enjoys an inalienable right to control certain aspects of 
the public presentation of his or her work. Thus, for example, Article 
6bis of the Berne Convention requires member nations to recognize 
the right of an author "to claim authorship of the work and to object 
to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other deroga­
tory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to 
his honor or reputation."? 
By contrast, while natural rights theories played a role in the devel­
opment of copyright in Anglo-American law, it is clear that the pri­
mary justification for copyright in these common-law countries was a 
utilitarian rationale. For example, the Patent and Copyright Clause of 
the U.S.  Constitution provides that "Congress shall have Power . . .  to 
Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries."8 The parallel construction of the Clause 
i ndicates that copyrights are granted to "authors" for their "writ­
ings" in order to promote the progress of "science" (broadly meaning 
"knowledge" in the language of the eighteenth century), while patents 
are granted to "inventors" for their "discoveries" in order to promote 
the progress of the "useful Arts" (Walterscheid 2002, 1 1-12, 1 15-33).9 
Thus, copyrights exist to promote knowledge by encouraging the cre­
ation and publication of new works. lO Both patents and copyrights, 
however, may be granted only "for limited Times," a restriction imposed 
i n  order to prevent the abuse of monopoly power that had existed in 
England prior to the Statute of Monopolies (which limited the dura­
tion of patents) and the Statute of Anne (which limited the duration of 
copyrights) (Ochoa and Rose 2002). In so doing, the Clause not only 
6 In French, droit d'alltellr; in German, Urlzeberrecilt; in Spanish, dereclzo de alltor. 
7 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 
1 886, revised at Paris, July 24, 1 97 1 ,  art. 6bis, S. Trcaty Doc. 99-27, 1 16 1  U.N.T.S. 30 
[hereinafter Berne Convention). 
H U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, d. 8. 
9 On the meaning of the word "Progress," see Pollack 20(ll, 794-809. 
In See Twcntieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 1 5 1 ,  1 56 ( 1975). 
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indicates that copyright should last no longer than necessary, but it 
also endorses the view that the progress of knowledge is best served by 
the creation of a "public domain," a body of works whose copyrights 
have expired and which can be freely copied by anyone (Walterschied 
2002, 265-77; Ochoa 2003; Litman 1990).11 
Despite these differences between nations concerning the princi­
pal rationale for copyright protection, it is  the case that something 
approaching an international consensus has emerged concerning the 
basic term of copyright in literary and artistic works. 1he following 
history of the development of copyright terms demonstrates how, over 
time, the United States and other common-law countries have gradu­
ally moved away from their primarily utilitarian perspective and closer 
to the natural rights theories of continental European countries, in the 
interests of international harmonization. 
2. HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT DURATION 
Through the Eighteenth Century: From Privileges to Copyright 
England 
After the invention of moveable type in  the fifteenth Century, Euro­
pean monarchs quickly realized that the printing press could be used 
as an instrument to spread sedition and heresy. Their response was to 
assert legal control over the new technology: no one could operate a 
printing press without royal permission. Such permission often took 
the form of letters patent, a document granting to a particular printer 
an exclusive privilege to print  a particular book or class of books for a 
specified period of time. Publishers were also required to submit any 
manuscripts that they wished to print to government censors for their 
approval (Patterson 1968, 20-27, 78-90; Kaplan 1967, 2-3; Rose 1993, 
9-1 1, 23-24). 
In 1557, Queen Mary granted a charter to the Stationers' Com­
pany, a guild of London booksellers and printers, which provided that 
no one could operate a printing press in England unless they were a 
member of the Company or unless they received a printing patent 
from the monarch. Because the Stationers effectively had a monopoly, 
they could prevent competition among themselves by agreeing to a 
II Sec also Sony Corp. of Amcrica, Inc. v. Univcrsal City Studios, Inc., 484 U.S. 
4 1 7, 429 ( 1 9B4) .  
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system of registration. Once secured by registration, the right to print 
a book continued forever and could be bequeathed or sold, but only 
to other members of the guild (Patterson 1968, 28-32, 42-56, 63-64; 
Kaplan 1967, 3-5). 
Under a series of decrees and statutes, no book could be printed in 
England unless it had first been registered with the Stationers (Pat­
terson 1968, 46-47, 115-39). In 1695, the last licensing act expired, 
thrOWing the book trade into disarray. The Stationers petitioned Parlia­
ment for relief, seeking a statute under which authors would have the 
exclusive right to print their works-an exclusive right that could, of 
course, be transferred to a publisher. As introduced, the proposed leg­
islation did not limit the duration of these copyrights (Patt.erson 1968, 
138-42; Rose 1993, 42-43). When the Statute of Anne was enacted 
in 1710, however, the term of copyright in new works was limited to 
14 years, with the possibility of renewal for a second 14-year term if 
the author was still living at the end of the first. For books that were 
already in print, the act provided a single 2 1-year termY These terms 
were based upon those in the 1623 Statute of Monopolies, which had 
l imited patents for new inventions to a single term of 14 years; that 
period, in turn, was derived from the traditional seven-year period for 
most apprenticeships (Ochoa and Rose 2002, 677-81). 
At first, the London booksellers simply ignored the term limit pro­
vision. But as the terms of copyright began to expire, Scottish book­
sellers began publishing competing reprints. This touched off a great 
debate in  England concerning the nature of literary property. Estab­
l ished publishers argued that an author had a natural right of property 
in his works that passed to the booksellers when the manuscript was 
purchased. Under this view, the Statute of Anne merely provided sup­
plemental remedies to an underlying common-law right that was per­
petual. Competing booksellers argued that there was no common-law 
right after a work had been published, and alternatively that any such 
right had been extinguished by the Statute of Anne (Ochoa and Rose 
2002, 681-83; Patterson 1968, 158-68; Rose 1993, 52-55, 69-78). 
The common-law right was upheld by the Court of King's Bench 
in Millar v. Taylor in 1769 (Patterson 1968, 16�-72), J3 but the defen­
dant's view prevailed in the Scottish Court of Sessions in Hinton v. 
Donaldsoll in 1773 (Boswell 1975; Rose 1993, 83-85). Finally, in 1774, 
12 8 Anne c. 1 9. § 1 ( 1 7 10 )  (Eng.). 
13 M illar v. Taylor. 4 Burr. 2303. 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769). 
\ 
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in the landmark decision of Donaldson v. Beckett, the House of Lords, 
acting as the Supreme Court of Great Britain, rejected the claim of 
perpetual common-law copyright and established that copyright was 
limited in term under the Statute of Anne (Ochoa and Rose 2002, 
683-84; Patterson 1968, 172-79; Rose 1993, 92-104).14 
France 
In  pre-Revolutionary Prance, all books had to be approved by official 
censors, and the author or publisher had to obtain a royal privilege 
before a book could he published. Such privileges were exclusive and 
were usually granted for a period of six years, but they could be renewed 
indefinitely (Dawson 1992, 3, 7- 10, 22-27; Davies 1994, 73-77). 
In  1777, a series of royal decrees changed the nature of these privi­
leges (Dawson 1992, 7-8, 18-19). The decree on the duration of privi­
leges provided a minimum duration for all privileges of the longer 
of ten years or the life of the author ( 1777 Decree, arts. 3, 4),15 The 
decree also prohibited the renewal of privileges and required a book 
to be augmented by at least a fourth to obtain a new privilege ( Id., art. 
2). Once a privilege had expired, anyone could obtain a "permission 
simple" to print or sell copies of the work (Id. ,  art. 6). 'n1is decree, 
therefore, expressly recognized a public domain in books whose privi­
leges had expired (Dawson 1992, 3). 
After the Prench Revolution, a dispute arose concerning the exclu­
sive privilege which had been granted to the Comedie Fraw;:aise to the 
public performance of all dramatic works (Ginsburg 1990, 1006). I n  
1791, the National Assembly voted t o  abolish the privilege and declared 
that the works of any author who had been deceased more than five 
years were public property (Id., 1006-07; 1791 Act, arts. 1_2).16 I n  the 
same decree, the Assembly granted to authors the exclusive right to 
authorize the public performance of their works during their l ifetimes, 
and extended that right to the author's heirs and assignees for five 
years after the author's death ( 179 1 Act, arts. 3-5). 
" Donaldson v. Beckett, 4 Burr. 240S, 9S Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L. 1 774). For a fuller 
account of the dehate, see Cobbett ISI3, 1 7: 953- 1003. 
15 A rret dtl cOllscii por/allt regiclllcllt stir ia dtlrec dcs pril'ii£lges ell librarie, Aug. 30, 
1777. 
II> Act oOan. 1 3- 1 9, 1 791 (Fr.). An English translation is availahle in  Sterling 2003, 
1 256-57. 
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In  1793, a new law was passed giving all authors, composers, and art­
ists the exclusive right to sell and distribute their works, and extending 
the right to their heirs and assigns for a period of ten years after the 
author's death.17 Although this law was based in part on the natural 
right theory, ninteenth-century commentators characterized the 1793 
law as utilitarian and "a charitable grant from sOciety" rather than a 
full recognition of the perpetual right of an author's heirs to the fruits 
of his labor (Ginsburg 1990, 1009-12). 
The United States 
In  1783, in  response to several authors' petitions, a committee of the 
Continental Congress reported that it was "persuaded that nothing 
is more properly a man's own than the fruit of his study, and that 
the protection and security of literary property would greatly tend to 
encourage genius [and] to promote useful discoveries" (Continental 
Congress 1783, 24: 326). Under the Articles of Confederation, the 
Continental Congress had no authority to issue copyrights; instead, it 
passed a resolution encouraging the States 
to secure to the authors or publishers of any new books not hitherto 
printed ... the copyright of such books for a certain time not less than 
fourteen years from the first publication; and to secure to the said 
authors, if they shall survive the term first mentioned , ... the copyright 
of such books for another term of time not less than fourteen years (Id., 
326-27). 
Three states had already enacted copyright statutes earlier that year, 
and within three years all of the remaining states except Delaware had 
followed suit. Seven of the states followed the Statute of Anne and the 
Continental Congress' resolution in providing two 14-year terms. The 
five remaining States granted copyrights for Single terms of 14, 20, or 
2 1  years' duration, with no right of renewal (Ochoa and Rose 2002, 
687-88). 
At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, both James Madison of 
Virginia and Charles Pinckney of South Carolina submitted propos­
als to give Congress the power to grant copyrights for a limited time. 
These proposals resulted in the Patent and Copyright Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution (Ochoa and Rose 2002, 688-90). As noted above, 
17 Act of July 1 9-24, 1 793, Arts. 1 , 2 (Fr.) .  An English translation is available in  
Sterling 2003, 1 260. 
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the Clause takes a utilitarian view of patents and copyrights, provid­
ing that exclusive rights may be granted "to Promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts" but only "for l imited Times."lB 
The Copyright Act of 1790 granted copyrights for a term of "four­
teen years from the time of recording the title thereof," with a right of 
renewal "for the further term of fourteen years" if the author survived 
to the end of the first term.19 The Act covered "any map, chart, book or 
books already printed within these United States," as well as "any map, 
chart, book or books already made and composed, but not printed 
or published, or that shall hereafter be made and composed." Except 
for the addition of maps and charts, this language was copied almost 
verbatim from the Statute of Anne. 
Because United States law was based primarily on a utilitarian the­
ory of copyright, it made little sense to offer copyright protection for 
any length of time unless the author or publisher affirmatively claimed 
that he or she wanted the benefit of copyright protection. Thus, United 
States law required that the author or publisher comply with vari­
ous statutory formalities as a condition of copyright protection. For 
example, the 1790 Act required that the author or publisher register 
the copyright with the clerk of the district court before publication 
and publish a notice of the registration in a newspaper for four weeks 
within two months of the registration (Id. §3, 1 Stat. 125). An 1802 
amendment required that the notice be printed in each published edi­
tion of the work.20 
In 1834, in  an American replay of Donaldson v. Beckett, the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled in Wheaton v. Peters that, although the author of 
an unpublished work had a common-law right to control the first pub­
lication of that work, the author did not have a common-law right to 
control reproduction following the first publication of the work, and 
that strict compliance with statutory formalities was required in  order 
to recover under the federal statute.21 Thus, in the United States there 
developed a dual system of copyright protection. Before a work was 
published or registered, it was protected under state law by common­
law copyright, which provided a right of first publication of potentially 
IH U.S. Canst., Art. I, §8, d. 8. 
IY Copyright Act of May 3 1 ,  1 790, c. 1 5, § 1, 1 Stat. 1 24.  
20 Act of Apr. 29, 1 802, c. 36, §l, 2 Stat. 1 7 1 .  
21 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 ( 1 834). For a comprehensive discussion, 
see Joyce 2005. 
LIMITS ON TIlE DURATION OF COPYRIGHT 161 
unlimited duration. After a work was published, however, one of two 
things happened. If all of the statutory formalities were satisfied, the 
work received a federal statutory copyright of the specified duration; 
but if the formalities were not observed, the work immediately entered 
the public domain (Nimmer and Nimmer 2005, §4.01 [BJ, §4.03). As a 
result, most works were not protected by copyright for any period of 
time after first publication; only those few works for which the author 
or publisher had complied with the statutory formalities received 
copyright protection for the duration provided by law. 
7he Nineteenth Century 
Throughout the nineteenth Century, the durations of national copy­
right or author's rights laws were extended numerous times. In 1810, 
France extended its author's rights law to last for the life of the author, 
then for the life of the author's widow, plus an additional 20 years.22 
I n  18 14, reciting that "it would afford further encouragement to lit­
erature, if the duration of such copyright were extended," England 
consolidated its two 14-year terms into a Single term of 28 years, "and 
if the author be living at the expiration of that time, till his death."23 
In  the United States, lexicographer Noah Webster took up the cause 
of extending the existing term of copyright. Webster advocated the 
view "that an author has, by common law, or natural justice, the sole 
and permanent right to make profit by his own labor" (Webster 1843, 
176). In  1830, a report prepared for the House Judiciary Committee 
by Webster's son-in-law, William W. Ellsworth, stated that "an author 
has an exclusive and perpetual right, in preference to any other, to the 
fruits of his labor" (Gales and Seton 1831, 7: cxix-cxx). Despite this 
endorsement of perpetual copyright as a natural right, the 1831 Act 
provided only an initial term of 28 years from first publication and a 
renewal term of 14 years, which could be claimed by the author's heirs 
if the author was deceased.24 
I n  1837, Prussia adopted a term of life of the author plus 30 years 
after the author's death.25 In the same year, in England, Thomas Noon 
22 Act of Feb. 5, 1 8 1 0, Arts. 39-40 (Fr.). 
23 Copyright Act of 1 8 1 4,54 Geo. III, c. 1 56, §9 (U.K.). lhe circumstances leading 
to the enactment of this extension are described in Lowndes 1840,64-72. 
21 Copyright Act of Feb. 2, 1831 ,  §§ 1 -2, 4 Stat. 436. 'Ihis term was extended to all 
subsisting copyrights. lei. § 1 6, 4 Stat. 439. 
2, Ordinance of July I I , 1 837, §§5-6 (Prussia). See Lowndes 1840, 1 25-26. 
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Talfourd introduced a bill that sought, among other things, to increase 
the period of copyright to life of the author plus 60 years. The bill was 
controversial, in large measure because of the length of term it pro­
posed, and it was debated at length over the next five years. Talfourd's 
bill was opposed by Macaulay, whose opposition killed the original 
proposal in 1841 (Seville 1999, 6, 18-19, 3 1). Macaulay proposed 
instead that the existing term be lengthened to the longer of 42 years 
from first publication or life of the author (Id., 3 1-31, 226). Eventually 
a compromise was reached, and the Copyright Act of 1842 provided 
an alternative term of life of the author plus seven years, or 42 years 
from first publication.26 
In 1 866, after a committee report that advocated perpetual rights, 
Prance extended the duration of its author's rights laws to life of the 
author plus 50 years after the author's death,27 a term that the com­
mittee considered "a major concession to the public interest" (Davies 
1994, 88-89). In 1870, the North German Confederation adopted 
a new copyright law which utilized the Prussian term of life of the 
author plus 30 years.28 This law was extended to the unified German 
Empire in 1 87 1 .  
In 1866, the United Kingdom, Prance, Germany, and seven other 
countries adopted the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary 
and Artistic Works, under which member nations agreed to provide 
copyright protection to the citizens and residents of other member 
nations (Ricketson and Ginsburg 2005, 82).29 At the time, however, 
the delegates were unable to reach agreement on a uniform duration 
of copyright, although they did agree on a non-binding resolution that 
recommended a minimum term of life of the author plus 30 years ( Id. 
2005, 536-38). Instead, the Convention provided for "comparison of 
terms" (also known as "the rule of the shorter term"), under which 
each country would protect works from other Berne countries for the 
same period of time granted to domestic works, but only so long as the 
work was still protected by copyright in its country of origin (Berne 
2" Copyright Act of 1 842, 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, §3 ( U.K.). 
27 Act of  July 1 4- 1 9, 1 866, Art. 1 (Fr.). 
2K Gcsetz bctrcffcnd das Urhcbcrrccht an Schriftwcrkcn, Abbildungcn, musika­
lischcn Kompositioncn und dramatischcn \Vcrkcn, Junc 1 1 ,  1 870, §§ 8,  9 (N. Gcr. 
Conf.). For a summary and English translation, scc Jcrrold 1881 ,  43-65. 
2" Bcrnc Convcntion for thc Protcction of Artistic and Litcrary Works, Scpt. 8, 
1866, art. 2. 
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1866, art. 2). Once the copyright expired in the country of origin, it 
expired in all other Berne nations as well. 
For the United States and other nations that remained outside the 
Berne Union, there was no legal obligation to provide any copyright 
protection to the works of foreign authors; and like most countries, 
the United States allowed the published works of foreign authors to be 
copied with impunity in the absence of any treaty obligation (Ochoa 
2008, 167-71). Moreover, even after the United States began to extend 
copyright protection to some foreign authors beginning in 1 891, it 
granted such protection only if the foreign author complied with the 
formalities required by United States law (Id., 172-1 73).30 Thus, for 
most of the nineteeth century, the term of protection provided to for­
eign authors in the United States was zero. 
7he Twentieth Century 
At the 1908 Berlin Conference to revise the Berne Convention, the Ger­
man delegation proposed that the term of protection be that granted 
to domestic authors in the country in which protection was sought, 
without regard to the term in the country of origin. Although this 
would have effectively lengthened the term of copyright, the proposal 
met with considerable resistance without a uniform term of protection 
(Ricketson and Ginsburg 2005, 538-39). Ultimately, the 1908 Berlin 
Revision recommended a term of life of the author plus 50 years, but 
otherwise retained the "rule of the shorter term."3l Although the Con­
vention did not make the term mandatory, the United Kingdom none­
theless adopted a life-plus-fifty-years term in its 19 1 1  Copyright Act.32 
In 1905, in  the United States, the Librarian of Congress convened a 
conference for the purpose of discussing a general revision of the copy­
right laws. At the conference, authors and publishers both expressed 
the view that the term of copyright ought to be as long as possible, 
and they suggested adoption of the French term of life of the author 
plus 50 years. The principal reasons advanced were that copyright was 
30 Act of M arch 3, 1 89 1 ,  c. 565, 26 Stat. 1 106. 
31 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 8, 
1 886, revised at Berlin, Nov. IS, 1 908, art. 7. 
31 Copyright Act of 1 9 1 1 , 2  Gco. V c. 46, §3 (U.K.). The Act provided, however, that 
after 25 years from the death of the author, anyone could reprint the work by giving 
notice and paying a royalty to the copyright owner of ten percent of the publishcd 
price for all copies sold (ltl. ) .  
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a natural right of the author; that authors ought not to outlive their 
copyrights; that it would provide income to the author's children and 
grandchildren; and that it ought not to be shorter than the term pre­
vailing in many European countries (Brylawski and Goldman 1975, C3, 
C7, Cll, C75, C78; Ochoa 2001, 33-39). At Congressional hearings in 
1906, the star witness was Mark Twain, who believed that copyright 
ought to be perpetual (Brylawski and Goldman 1975, JI 16-20; Ochoa 
2001, 36). Twain also remarked, however, that he had been able to 
negotiate a much higher price for his works at the time of renewal 
(Brylawski and Goldman, K20, K6 1-66, K88, K 163, S 14; Ochoa 2001, 
37-38). As a result, in the 1909 Act Congress retained an initial term 
of 28 years, but it extended the renewal term to 28 years, for a maxi­
mum duration of 56 years from the date of first publication.33 
Elsewhere, the march toward longer terms continued. In 1934, Ger­
many adopted a term of life of the author plus 50 years, and Austria 
followed suit in 1936.34 Finally, in the 1948 Brussels Revision of the 
Berne Convention, a minimum term of life of the author plus 50 years 
was made mandatory, while the "rule of the shorter term" was retained 
for those nations that had longer terms.35 The basic term of life plus 
50 years was carried forward in the 1967 Stockholm Revision and the 
1971 Paris Revision of the Berne Convention.36 
In the United States, the Copyright Act of 1976 adopted the Berne 
Convention term of life of the author plus 50 years for all works cre­
ated on or after January 1, 1978 (except for "works made for hire," 
which were given the shorter of 75 years from first publication or 100 
years from creation).37 Those works that had been published or reg­
istered before 1978 and were still under copyright retained an initial 
term of 28 years but had their renewal terms extended to 47 years, for 
3J Copyright Act of 1 909, §§23-24, 35 Stat. 1 075, 1080-81 .  
31 Act o f  Dec. 1 3, 1 934, Art. 1 (Ger.); Act o f  Apr. 9 ,  1 936, Art. 6 0  (Aus.). 
35 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 
1 886, revised at Brussels, June 26, 1 948, art. 7( 1 )  (basic term); id. art. 7(2) (comparison 
of terms). 'lhe minimum basic term was not applied to cincmatographic and photo­
graphic works. Id., art. 7(3). 
3 6  Bernc Convention for thc Protcction of Literary and Artistic \Vorks, Sept. 9, 
1 886, revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1 967, art. 7( 1 )  (basic tcrm); id., art. 7(8) (com­
parison of terms); Bernc Convention, slIpra notc 7, art. 7( 1) (basic tcrm); id., art. 7(8) 
(comparision of tcrms). 
37 Fortner 17 U.S.c. §302 ( 1 976), 90 Stat. 245 1 ,  2572. 
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a maximum duration of 75 years from first publication.38 As a tran­
sitional measure, those works created before 1978 that had not been 
published or registered (and which therefore were still protected by 
state common-law copyright) were accorded the same term given to 
new works, subject to a statutory minimum term of either 25 or 50 
years.39 The adoption of the life-plus-50-years term was principally 
motivated by the prospect of eventual U.S. adherence to the Berne 
Convention,40 which finally occurred on March 1, 1989,4l 
In 1993, the Council of the European Community decided to har­
monize copyright terms. At the time, only Germany and Spain had 
terms longer than life-plus-SO years; but rather than requiring Ger­
many and Spain to reduce their copyright terms, the Council required 
all of the other European nations to increase their copyright terms to 
life plus-70-years.42 In the same Directive, however, the Council man­
dated the use of the rule of the shorter term, so that works from the 
United States and other non-European countries would not receive 
the benefit of the longer term (ld. , art. 7(1)). That, in turn, led Ameri­
can copyright holders to pressure Congress to adopt the life-plus-70 
years term, which it did in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Exten­
sion Act of 1998 (CTEA). 43 Shortly after its enactment, the CTEA was 
challenged in court on the grounds that it violated both the Patent and 
Copyright Clause and the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
On January 15, 2003, however, the United States Supreme Court held 
that the CTEA did not violate the U.S. Constitution,44 meaning that 
the terms of protection set forth in the CTEA currently govern the 
duration of copyright in the United States. 
3" Former 1 7  U.s.c. §304 ( 1 976),90 Stat. at 2573-74. 
39 Former 17 U.S.c. §303 ( 1976),90 Stat. at 2573. All unpublished works received 
a statutory minimum of 25 years until December 3 1 ,  2002; if the work was published 
during that period, the statutory minimum was extended through December 3 1 ,  2027 
( IJ). 
10 See H.R. Rep. No. 94- 1476, at 1 35 ( 1 976). 11 See Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 
2853. 
12 Council Directive 93/98/EEC of October 29, 1993, Harmonizing the Term of 
Protection of Copyright and Certain Related Rights, art. 1 ( 1 ), 1993 0.). (L  290) 9. 
13 P.L. No. 105-298, Title I, 1 1 2 Stat. 2827. 
11 See Eldred v.  Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (20(l3). 
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2. CURRENT LAWS ON COPYRIGHT DURATION 
Copyright and Neighboring Rights 
It is important to note that most countries of the world distinguish 
between copyright in literary and artistic works and so-called "neigh­
boring rights" of performers, producers of sound recordings ("pho­
nograms" in international parlance), and broadcasting organizations. 
Various reasons have been given for the distinction. For sound record­
ings, "the objection was made that these were productions of an 
'industrial character' and not capable of constituting literary or artistic 
creations" (Ricketson and Ginsburg 2005, 1205). Both broadcasts and 
sound recordings are typically produced through the collaboration of a 
large number of individuals, making it difficult to identify the "author" 
or "authors" of such works. Of course, similar objections were also 
raised with respect to both photographs and motion pictures, both of 
which are now protected under the Berne Convention, so the result­
ing division of labor between copyright and neighboring rights seems 
to be rather arbitrary, a matter of historical accident more than sound 
principle (Id., 1205-1209). Nonetheless, it is a fact that the term of 
protection accorded to such "neighboring rights" has lagged behind 
the term of protection granted to "literary and artistic works" under 
the Berne Convention; indeed, even though photographs and motion 
pictures succeeded in  being brought under Berne, the term of protec­
tion prOVided to such works has not always kept pace with the basic 
term of protection. 
International Agreements Concerning Copyright 
Article 7 of the Berne Convention provides that "[t]he term of pro­
tection granted by this Convention shall be the life of the author and 
fifty years after his death" (Berne 1971, art. 7(1)). For works of joint 
authorship, the term is measured from the death of the last surviving 
author (Id. ,  art. 7bis). However, for motion pictures (or "cinemato­
graphic works" in international parlance), countries "may provide that 
the term of protection shall expire fifty years after the work has been 
made available to the public with the consent of the author," or if 
the work is not made available to the public, within 50 years after 
its making (Id., art. 7(2)). Anonymous and pseudonymous works are 
also protected for "fifty years after the work has been lawfully made 
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available to the public," unless the author discloses his or her iden­
tity during that time (Id., art. 7(3)). Countries are permitted to pro­
vide shorter terms of protection to photographic works and works of 
applied art, but such terms must last at least 25 years from the time the 
work was created (Id., art. 7(4». All the foregoing terms of protection 
run to the end of the calendar year in which they would otherwise 
expire (Id., art. 7(5». 
As of October 15,2008, there were 164 members of the Berne Union 
(WIPO 2008a). Those countries that were already members of the 
Rome Act of the Convention and that had shorter terms on the date 
they signed either the Stockholm text or the Paris text were permitted 
to retain such shorter terms (Berne 1971, art. 7(7». All countries are 
permitted to grant longer terms of protection (Id., art. 7(6». "In any 
case, the term shall be governed by the legislation of the country where 
protection is claimed; however, unless the legislation of that country 
otherwise provides, the term shall not exceed the term fixed in the 
country of origin of the work" (Id., art. 7(7». 
Article 6bis of the Berne Convention requires that the author's moral 
rights of attribution and integrity "shall, after his death, be maintained, 
at least until the expiry of the economic rights." However, those coun­
tries that did not protect such rights after the death of the author at the 
time of their accession are permitted to retain terms that cease upon 
the author's death (Id., art. 6bis(2)). 
'The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) makes all of the substantive provisions of the Berne 
Convention (except Article 6bis) enforceable between nations through 
the dispute resolution mechanism of the World Trade Organization 
(TRIPS, arts. 9, 64).45 As of July 23, 2008, there were 153 members of 
the World Trade Organization, all of whom must abide by the TRIPS 
Agreement (WTO 2008). TRIPS does not change the basic term of 
protection prOVided by Berne except in one instance: Article 12 of 
TRIPS requires that photographs and works of applied art be given at 
least 50 years of protection from the year of authorized publication, 
45 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,  
1 994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex Ie, 
Legal I nstruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 1 869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I .L.M. 1 197 
(J 994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement). 
\ 
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or if no such publication occurs, 50 years from the date the work was 
created (TRIPS, art. 12). 
Article 9 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty requires that member 
nations give photographic works the same duration of protection as 
that provided to other literary and artistic works: namely, life of the 
author plus 50 years:16 As of March 5, 2009, 70 countries (including 
the United States) were parties to the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WIPO 
2009c). 
In addition to these multilateral treaties, the United States (a net 
exporter of copyrighted works) has entered into a number of bilateral 
Free Trade Agreements that require some of its trading partners (such 
as Australia) to adopt a basic term of copyright protection of l ife of 
the author plus 70 years.47 Other countries (such as Canada), how­
ever, have resisted pressure from the United States and the European 
Union to increase copyright terms beyond those provided in the Berne 
Convention.48 
International Agreemen ts COl1cernil1g Neighboring Rights 
The Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of 
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations was signed on October 
26, 1961.49 It provides that performers shall have the right to prevent 
fixations, reproductions, and broadcasts of their performances (I d., art 
7); that producers of phonograms have the right to prohibit reproduc­
tions of their phonograms and to be compensated for any broadcasts 
16 WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1 996, art. 9, 36 I .L.M. 65. 
'7 Sec, e.g., United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, art . 1 7.4(4) (May 1 8, 
2(04). 'lhe Agreement also provides a minimum term for works made for hire of 
70 years after first publication, or if  the work is not published within 50 years, 70 
years after creation (Id.). 'Ihere arc similar provisions in  the Free Trade Agreements 
between the United States and Bahrain (Art. 1 4.4(4)),  Chile (Art. 1 7.5(4)), Columbia 
(Art. 1 6.5(5)), Korea (Art. 1 8.4(4)), Morocco (Art. 1 5.5(5)), Panama (Art. 1 5.5(4)), 
Peru (Art. 1 6.5(5)), and Singapore (Art. 1 6.4(4)). In  the Free Trade Agreement with 
Oman, the alternative term is 95 years after first publication, or if the work is not 
published within 25 years, 1 20 years from creation (Art. 1 5.4(4)). For the full  texts of 
these agreements, see USTR 2009. 
4X Sec, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, Art. 1 705 (l ife-phls-50-years); 
Copyright Act art. 6, R.S.C. 1 985, ch. C-42, §6; RS.C. 1 993, ch. 44, §6 (Can.). Although 
NAFT A's minimum term remains a t  life-plus-50 years, in 2003 Mexico adopted a 
basic term of l ife-plus- 100 years. Sec La Ley Federal del Derecho de Autor, A rt. 29 
(Mex.). 
,') International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phono­
grams and Broadcasting Organizations, Oct. 26. 1 96 1 .  496 U.N.T.S. 44. 
LIMITS ON TIlE DURATION OF COPYRIGHT 169 
of their phonograms (Id., arts. 10, 12); and that broadcasting organi­
zations have the right to prevent fixations, reproductions or rebroad­
casts of their broadcasts (Id., art. 1 3). Under Article 1 4  of the Rome 
Convention, such protection shall last at least 20 years from the year 
in which the performance took place, the fixation was made, or the 
broadcast took place (Id., art. 14). As of February 13, 2009, 88 nations 
(not including the United States) were parties to the Rome Conven­
tion (WIPO 2009a). 'TIle United States, however, has acceded to the 
197 1  Geneva Phonograms Convention, which also provides a right 
against unauthorized reproduction for a minimum term of 20 years 
from the date of fixation or first publication.50 
'The TRIPS Agreement provides rights similar to the Rome Con­
vention (except for the compensation for unauthorized broadcasts 
of phonograms), but it provides a longer term of protection for per­
formers and producers of phonograms of at least 50 years from the 
year in which the fixation was made or the performance took place 
(TRIPS, art. 14(5)). The minimum term of protection for broadcast­
ing organizations remains 20 years from the date the broadcast took 
place. (Id.). 
'The WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) provides 
similar protection for both performers and producers of phonograms 
(omitting broadcasting organizations), and provides to performers a 
minimum term of 50 years from the year in which the fixation was 
made, and to producers a minimum alternative term of 50 years from 
the year in which the phonogram was first published or 50 years from 
the year in which the phonogram was fixedY As of December 1 8, 
2008, 68 nations (including the United States) were parties to the 
WPPT (WIPO 2008b). 
I n  addition to these multilateral treaties, the United States has 
entered into a number of bilateral Free Trade Agreements that require 
some of its trading partners (such as Australia) to adopt a basic term 
of protection for performers of life-plus-70 years, and for phonograms 
so Geneva Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against 
Unauthorized Duplication of 'lheir Phonograms, Oct. 29, 1971 ,  art. 4, 25 U.S.T. 309, 
866 U.N.T.S. 71. As of February 25, 2009, there were 77 members of the Geneva Pho­
nograrns Convention (WI PO 2009b). 
5 1  WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76, arts. 
5- 10 (performers); id. arts. 1 1 - 14 (producers); id. art. 17 (terms of protection) . 
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of 70 years after first publication, or if the phonogram is not published 
within 50 years, 70 years after creation.52 
1he European Union 
The European Union's Directive on the Term of Protection of Copy­
right and Certain Related Rights applies to the 27 members of the 
European Union and the three other members of the European Eco­
nomic Area.53 Under the Directive, " [ tlhe rights of an author of a lit­
erary or artistic work . . .  shall run for the life of the author and for 70 
years after his death (Directive, art. 1 (1 »." For works of joint author­
ship, the term is calculated from the death of the last surviving author 
(Id., art. 1 (2». For anonymous or pseudonymous works and collective 
works, the term is the longer 70 years from the year the work is law­
fully made available to the public or 70 years from the year of creation, 
unless the identity of the individual author or authors is disclosed (Id., 
arts. 1(3), 1(4), 1(6». 
Original photographs are given the same term of protection as other 
literary and artistic works (Id., art. 6). For cinematographic works, the 
term is 70 years after the death of the last of the following to survive: 
the principal director, the author of the screenplay, the author of the 
dialogue and the composer of music written specifically for the film 
(Id., art. 2). 
The neighboring rights of performers, producers of phonograms, 
and broadcasting organizations last for 50 years after the date of the 
performance, the fixation, or the broadcast, respectively; except that if 
a performance or phonogram is lawfully published or communicated 
,2 See, e.g., United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, art. 1 7.4(4) .  'Ihere are 
similar provisions in  the Free Trade Agreements between the United States and Bah­
rain (Art. 1 4 .4 (4)) ,  Chile (Art. 1 7.6(7)), Columbia (Art. 1 6.6(7)), Korea (Art. 1 8.4(4)), 
Morocco (Art. 1 5.5(5)), Panama (Art. 1 5.5(4)), Peru (Art. 1 6.6(7)), and Singapore 
(Art. 1 6.4(4)) .  In the Free Trade Agreement with Oman, the alternative term is 95 
years after first publication, or if  the work is not published within 25 years, 1 20 years 
from creation (Art. 1 5.4(4)) . (USTR 2(09) .  
5 3  Directive 2006/ l 1 6/EC of December 1 2, 2006, on the Term of Protection of 
Copyright and Certain Related Rights, art. 1 ( 1 ), 2006 0.) .  (L  374) 1 2; European 
Union, Europa: European Countries, Member States of the EU, at http://curopa.cu/ 
abc/europcan_countrics/eu_mcmbcrs/indcx_en.htm (acccsscd Scpt. I, 2(09); Agrce­
mcnt on thc Europcan Economic Area, May 2, 1 992, 1 994 0.). ( I ,  I) 3, anncx XVI I ,  � 
9(, at http://www.cfta.int/contcnt!lcgal-tcxts/cca/anncxcs/anncx 1 7.pdf (accessed Sept. 
1 , 2(09).  
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to the public during that time, then the right lasts for 50 years after the 
earlier of such publication or communication (ld., art. 3). 
The Directive also requires that when a previously unpublished 
work is published or communicated to the public for the first time, the 
publisher must be granted an exclusive right for 25 years from the date 
of such publication or communication (Id., art. 4). In addition, the 
Directive permits members to protect "critical and scientific editions 
of works which have come into the public domain." If such protection 
is granted, it may last no longer than 30 years from the year in which 
the publication was first lawfully published (ld., art. 5). 
As mentioned previously, the Directive mandates the use of the 
"rule of the shorter term" with regard to works originating in and 
written by nationals of countries that are not covered by the Directive 
(ld., art. 7). All terms run to the end of the calendar year in which they 
would otherwise expire (ld., art. 8). If a member state provided a lon­
ger term of protection as oOuly 1, 1995, the Directive does not require 
the member state to shorten the term of protection (ld., art. 10( 1». 
Finally, it should be noted that the Directive does not apply to the 
moral rights of an author, leaving a member state free to apply a lon­
ger (or shorter) term for such moral rights (ld., art. 9). In France, 
for example, the law expressly states that an author's moral rights are 
perpetual. 54 
I n  April 2009, the European Parliament approved a proposed 
amendment to the Directive that would extend the rights of perform­
ers and producers of phonograms to 70 years from the first authorized 
publication or communication to the public (European Parliament 
2009). Although this amendment has not yet been approved by the 
Council, its probable adoption suggests that the march toward ever­
longer terms continues unabated. 
U1lited States 
In  the United States, all works published before 1923 were in the pub­
l ic domain before the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 
1998 was enacted. The CTEA did not attempt to revive any expired 
copyrights, so all such works remain in the public domain ( I7  U.S.c. 
§304(b». For works first published between 1923 and 1963, the term 
51 Law No. 92-597 of July \ ,  1 992 (Fr.), as amcndcd, art. L. 1 2 1 - 1 .  
/ 
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of copyright under the 1909 Act was 28 years, which could be renewed 
once;55 the renewal term was extended twice and is now 67 years, for 
a maximum duration of 95 years from first publication ( 17 U.S.c. 
§304(b». Copyright Office records, however, show that less than 15 
percent of the works registered during this time period were renewed; 
the remaining 85 percent are in the public domain if they are works 
by American authors or works first published in the United States 
(Ringer 1960, 222).56 In 1992, copyright renewal was made automatic, 
so all works first published between 1964 and 1977 have a duration of 
95 years from the date of first publication (comprising a 28-year initial 
term and a 67-year renewal term) (17 U.S.c. §§304(a), 304(b)). 
For works created in 1978 or later, the basic term is life of the author 
plus 70 years (Id., §302(a». For so-called "joint works" (Le., works of 
joint authorship), the term if l ife of the last surviving author plus 70 
years (Id., §302(b)). For works made for hire, the term is 95 years from 
the date of first publication, or 120 years from the date of creation, 
whichever is shorter (Id., §302(c)). 
Works created before 1978, but not published or registered before 
1978, get the same term provided to new works: life of the author 
plus 70 years, or the alternative fixed term for works made for hire. 
These works, however, were subject to a statutory minimum term of 
25 years from January I ,  1978, which has now expired (Id., §303(a)). 
As a result, any works created before 1978 that remained unpublished 
as of December 3 1, 2002, are now in the public domain if the author of 
the work died more than 70 years before the current year began (Reese 
2007, 59 1; Gard 2006, 690). 'TIlOse works that were created before 1978, 
but which were first published between 1978 and 2002, received the 
same term as new works, subject to a statutory minimum term, which 
has been extended to December 3 1, 2047 ( 17 U.S.c. §303(a)). 
A special situation applies to copyright in sound recordings. Sound 
recordings were not added to the federal Copyright Act until February 
I S, 1972. Any sound recordings fixed on or after that date are enti­
tled to the same term of protection as that granted to other works of 
" Fonner 1 7  U.S.c. §24 ( I 909; repealed 1 976). 
50 Works of foreign origin that were in  the public domain in  the U.S. for failure to 
comply with formalities such as notice or renewal. but  that were not yet in  the public 
domain in their country of origin. had their copyrights restored effective January I .  
1 996. See 1 7  U.S.c. § 104A(a)( I ) (A); id. § I04A(h)(2) (defining "date o f  restoration") ;  
id. § I04A(h)(6) (defining "restored work"). 
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authorship. Any sound recordings fixed before that date, however, are 
governed by state law rather than by federal law; and federal law pro­
vides that any state-law protection shall not be preempted by federal 
law until Pebruary I S, 2067 (95 years from the date sound recordings 
first became eligible for federal copyright protection) (Id., §30 1 (c)). 
This leaves the term of copyright in such pre- 1972 sound recordings 
up to the individual states. 
Only one state has a statute regarding the duration of copyright in 
such sound recordings:  California provides that all such sound record­
ings will be protected until February I S, 2047.57 In one other state 
there is a court decision concerning the duration of copyright in such 
sound recordings. In 2005, the New York Court of Appeals (the high­
est court in the state of New York) held that sound recordings had 
a perpetual common-law copyright under New York law; that such 
sound recordings were not placed in the public domain when pho­
norecords of the sound recording were reproduced and distributed in 
New York; and that such sound recordings did not enter the public 
domain in New York when their copyrights expired in their country of 
origin.58 Consequently, all sound recordings will remain under copy­
right in the state of New York until state law is preempted by federal 
law on Pebruary 15, 2067. 
3. CONCLUSION 
A rational choice concerning the duration of copyright cannot be 
made until some kind of consensus has been reached on the rationale 
for copyright protection. While common-law systems started from a 
utilitarian perspective, international harmonization has moved them 
much closer toward the natural right view of copyright that prevails in 
most civil law countries. Even in  such countries, however, the counter­
vailing considerations of increased access to literary and artistic works 
and the difficulty of identifying and locating copyright owners have led 
to some temporal limit on the duration of copyright. 
The history of copyright duration demonstrates that while copy­
right terms have been lengthened a number of times, they are almost 
,7 Cal. Civ. Code §980(a)(2). 
"M See Capitol Records. Inc. v. Naxos of America. Inc . •  830 N.E.2d 250 (N.Y. 
20(5). 
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never shortened. 'This is consistent with the principles of public choice 
theory discussed above, which hold that when the benefits of a law are 
concentrated but the costs of that law are diffuse, a small well-focused 
interest group will usually succeed in obtaining passage of the law, 
even if it does not benefit society as a whole. However, because of 
the controversy concerning the CTEA, public awareness of the costs 
of extending the duration of copyright has been raised (Karjala 2007; 
Lessig 2004). TIlUS, while it can be expected that copyright owners 
will attempt to obtain further extensions of the copyright term in  
the future, it also should be  expected that they will meet with more 
Significant opposition than they faced in 1998. Whether opponents 
of copyright term extension will have the political power to succeed 
in defeating future attempts at copyright term extension, however, 
remains to be seen. 
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